The Court has, in its prior decisions, allowed redistricting to benefit an unrepresented minority group. 10 This appears to be what has occurred in this instance. SHAW ET AL. The Court characterizes the decision as "highly fractured," ante, at 651, but that should not detract attention from the rejection by a majority in UJO of the claim that the State's intentional creation of majority-minority districts transgressed constitutional norms. Pp. Despite their invocation of the ideal of a "color-blind" Constitution, seePlessy v. Ferguson(1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting), appellants appear to concede that race-conscious redistricting is not always unconstitutional. That concession is wise: This Court never has held that race-conscious state decisionmaking is impermissible inallcircumstances. 408 (E.D.N.C. The Court affirmed the District Court's dismissal of the complaint on the ground that plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving discriminatory intent. Appellants contend that redistricting legislation that is so bizarre on its face that it is "unexplainable on grounds other than race,"Arlington Heights, demands the same close scrutiny that we give other state laws that classify citizens by race. Accord, Loving v. Virginia, 388 U. S. 1, 11 (1967). by Daniel J. Popeo and Richard A. Samp. Thus, state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens on account of race-whether it contains an explicit distinction or is "unexplainable on grounds other than race," Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U. S. 252, 266-must be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Classifications of citizens on the basis of race "are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality." But it suffices to illustrate the unworkability of a standard that is divorced from any measure of constitutional harm. The Attorney General did not object to the General Assembly's revised plan. Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. Id., at 349 (concurring opinion). Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created district, and imagining an entirely new cause of action. It is particularly ironic that the case in which today's majority chooses to abandon settled law and to recognize for the first time this "analytically distinct" constitutional claim, ante, at 652, is a challenge by white voters to the plan under which North Carolina has sent black representatives to Congress for the first time since Reconstruction. The first involves direct and outright deprivation of the right to vote, for example by means of a poll tax or literacy test. Why was Shaw v Reno an important decision in terms of minority representation? The parties' arguments about whether the plan was necessary to avoid dilution of black voting strength in violation of 2 of the Act and whether the State's interpretation of 2 is unconstitutional were not developed below, and the issues remain open for consideration on remand. of Gal. Gomillion, supra, at 341. The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims. (emphasis added). On the brief were Acting Solicitor General Bryson, Acting Assistant Attorney General Turner, Thomas G. Hungar, and Jessica Dunsay Silver. Hence, I see no need. Washington v. Davis(1976). Such approval would be forthcoming only if the plan did not jeopardize minority representation. 1300 (1966). In the lower court record, the district was said to resemble a Rorschach ink-blot test, and theWall Street Journalclaimed the district looked like a "bug splattered on a windshield." In Beer, we held that a reapportionment plan that created one majorityminority district where none existed before passed muster under 5 because it improved the position of racial minorities. Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. The Court offers them no explanation of this paradox. This case involves two of the most complex and sensitive issues this Court has faced in recent years: the meaning of the constitutional "right" to vote, and the propriety of race-based state legislation designed to benefit members of historically disadvantaged racial minority groups. Appellants allege that the revised plan, which contains district boundary lines of dramatically irregular shape, constitutes an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. In the 1870's, for example, opponents of Reconstruction in Mississippi "concentrated the bulk of the black population in a 'shoestring' Congressional district running the length of the Mississippi River, leaving five others with white majorities." I join JUSTICE WHITE'S dissenting opinion. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . Byron R. White White. See UJO, 430 U. S., at 165-166 (plurality opinion of WHITE, J., joined by STEVENS and REHNQUIST, JJ. We also do not decide whether appellants' complaint stated a claim under constitutional provisions other than the Fourteenth Amendment. What was argued? Id., at 179 (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment). 808 F. Even if racial distribution was a factor, no racial group can be said to have been "segregated"-i. e., "set apart" or "isolate[d]." 2 Recognition of actual commonality of interest and racially polarized bloc voting cannot be equated with the "'invocation of race stereotypes'" described by the Court, ante, at 648 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U. S. 614, 630-631 (1991)), and forbidden by our case law. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301, 309-313 (1966). 364 U. S., at 341. . Accordingly, we have held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires state legislation that expressly distinguishes among citizens because of their race to be narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. For these reasons, we conclude that a plaintiff challenging a reapportionment statute under the Equal Protection Clause may state a claim by alleging that the legislation, though race-neutral on its face, rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to separate voters into different districts on the basis of race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. 430 U. S., at 165. In whatever district, the individual voter has a right to vote in each election, and the election will result in the voter's representation. Today we hold only that appellants have stated a claim under the Equal Protection Clause by alleging that the North Carolina General Assembly adopted a reapportionment scheme so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort to segregate voters into separate voting districts because of their race, and that the separation lacks sufficient justification. Under this approach, in the absence of an allegation of such cognizable harm, there is no need for further scrutiny because a gerrymandering claim cannot be proven without the element of harm. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U. S., at 157-158; Growe v. Emison, 507 U. S., at 40. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. Since there is no justification for the departure here from the principles that continue to govern electoral districting cases generally in accordance with our prior decisions, I would not respond to the seeming egregiousness of the redistricting now before us by untethering the concept of racial gerrymander in such a case from the concept of harm exemplified by dilution. See Brief for Republican National Committee as Amicus Curiae 14-15. 633, 637 (1983). But a principal consequence of school segregation was inequality in educational opportunity provided, whereas use of race (or any other group characteristic) in districting does not, without more, deny equality of political participation. 639-642. This question also need not be decided at this stage of the litigation. 4 The Court's opinion suggests that African-Americans may now be the only group to which it is unconstitutional to offer specific benefits from redistricting. In Shaw v. Reno (1993), the U.S. Supreme Court questioned the use of racial gerrymandering in North Carolina's reapportionment plan. ); post, at 684, and n. 6 (opinion of SOUTER, J. See, e. g., Guinn v. United States, 238 U. S. 347 (1915). Although the Court concluded that the redistricting scheme at issue in Beer was nonretrogressive, it did not hold that the plan, for that reason, was immune from constitutional challenge. 5 See Richmond v. J. Appellee Reno . to Juris. Journalize the entry to record and establish the allowance using the percentage method for January credit sales. Bandemer, 478 U. S., at 164 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotation marks omitted). William H. Rehnquist Rehnquist. Again, in White v. Regester, supra, the same criteria were used to uphold the District Court's finding that a redistricting plan was unconstitutional. United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U. S. 144, 161-162 (1977) (UJO) (pluralityopinion of WHITE, J., joined by Brennan, BLACKMUN, and STEVENS, JJ. They were the first blacks to represent North Carolina, a state with a 20 percent black population, since 1901. denied, 409 U. S. 893 (1972); Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 83-94 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U. S. 725, 744-765 (1983) (STEVENS, J., concurring); see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 161-185 (1986) (Powell, J., joined by STEVENS, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The question before us is whether appellants have stated a cognizable claim. Significant changes in the area of redistricting and gerrymandering, 1. The majority's contrary view is perplexing in light of its concession that "compactness or attractiveness has never been held to constitute an independent federal constitutional requirement for state legislative districts." See post, at 679 (opinion of STEVENS, J. Pp. In an opinion which explored the nature of "political questions" and the appropriateness of Court action in them, the Court held that there were no such questions to be answered in this case and that legislative apportionment was a justiciable issue. Politicians have always relied on assumptions that people in particular groups are likely to vote in a particular way when they draw new district lines, and I cannot believe that anything in today's opinion will stop them from doing so in the future. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267 (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. We have considered the constitutionality of these practices in other Fourteenth Amendment cases and have required plaintiffs to demonstrate that the challenged practice has the purpose and effect of diluting a racial group's voting strength. Because extirpating such considerations from the redistricting process is unrealistic, the Court has not invalidated all plans that consciously use race, but rather has looked at their impact. Id., at 357 (internal quotation marks omitted). Instead, the General Assembly enacted a revised redistricting plan, 1991 N. C. Extra Sess. There is thus no theoretical inconsistency in having two distinct approaches to equal protection analysis, one for cases of electoral districting and one for most other types of state governmental decisions. Proc. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. It was 160 miles long and generally corresponded to the Interstate 85 corridor. Other decisions of this Court adhere to the same standards. -using race in redistricting is as important of it being continuous. In our view, the court used the wrong analysis. The majority, however, accepted the District Court's finding that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the districts were in fact drawn on racial lines. There is no independent constitutional requirement of compactness or contiguity, and the Court's opinion (despite its many references to the shape of District 12, see ante, at 635-636, 641, 642, 644-648) does not suggest otherwise. Until today, the Court has analyzed equal protection claims involving race in electoral districting differently from equal protection claims involving other forms of governmental conduct, and before turning to the different regimes of analysis it will be useful to set out the relevant respects in which such districting differs from the characteristic circumstances in which a State might otherwise consciously consider race. Tr. In other words, the statute was invalid because, on its face, it could not be explained on grounds other than race. (1986) (teacher layoffs), electoral districting calls for decisions that nearly always require some consideration of race for legitimate reasons where there is a racially mixed population. See App. I dissent. NO racial gerrymandering; race cannot be the sole or predominant factor in redrawing legislative boundaries; majority-minority districts. The Court today answers this question in the affirmative, and its answer is wrong. These unarguable facts, which the Court devotes most of its opinion to proving, give rise to three constitutional questions: Does the Constitution impose a requirement of contiguity or compactness on how the States may draw their electoral districts? In our view, the District Court properly dismissed appellants' claims against the federal appellees. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. Three Justices rejected the plaintiffs' claim on the grounds that the New York statute "represented no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites or any other race" and left white voters with better than proportional representation. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). Statement 67a-lOOa (Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and For Temporary Restraining Order). The only justification I can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," such as compactness and contiguity. In the 1992 elections voters in both districts selected black representatives. of Ed., 476 U. S. 267, 277-278 (plurality opinion). Even Members of the Court least inclined to approve of race-based remedial measures have acknowledged the significance of this factor. Instead, it is the State that must rebut the allegation that race was taken into account, a fact that, together with the legislators' consideration of ethnic, religious, and other group characteristics, I had thought we practically took for granted, see supra, at 660. Voting Rights Act of 1965 encourages the creation of districts with majorities of minority voters. to Juris. several smaller, dispersed facilities? J.). See ante, at 642-643. (1) The Common Cause District Court concluded that all but one of the districts in North Carolina's 2016 Plan violated the Equal Protection Clause by intentionally diluting the voting strength of Demo crats. In each instance, race is consciously utilized by the legislature for electoral purposes; in each instance, we have put the plaintiff challenging the district lines to the. See, e. g., Holland v. Illinois, 493 U. S. 474, 484, n. 2 (1990) ("[A] prosecutor's assumption that a black juror may be presumed to be partial simply because he is black violates the Equal Protection. The jurisdiction must obtain either a judgment from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia declaring that the proposed change "does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color" or administrative preclearance from the Attorney General. One state legislator has remarked that" '[i]f you drove down the interstate with both car doors open, you'd kill most of the people in the district.'" It did not do so. Blumstein, Defining and Proving Race Discrimination: Perspectives on the Purpose V s. Results Approach from the Voting Rights Act, 69 Va. L. Rev. After the General Assembly passed legislation creating the second district, a group of white voters in North Carolina, led by Ruth O. Shaw, sued on the grounds that the district was an unconstitutional gerrymander . Cf. But nothing in our case law compels the conclusion that racial and political gerrymanders are subject to precisely the same constitutional scrutiny. Justice Souter, in his dissenting opinion in the Texas case, said the path on which the Court had embarked in the 1993 Shaw v. Reno decision, from which he also dissented, had proven unworkable. We note, however, that only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the requirements of the Voting Rights Act. This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. Redistricting advantage for blacks faces more scrutiny than an advantage for a non-minority. The Justice Department under the George H.W. The General Assembly enacted a reapportionment plan that included one majority-black congressional district. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. See, e. g., Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U. S. 613, 616-617 (1982); White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973). But as JUSTICE WHITE points out, see ante, at 672 (dissenting opinion), and as the Court acknowledges, see ante, at 647, we have held that such principles are not constitutionally required, with the consequence that their absence cannot justify the distinct constitutional regime put in place by the Court today. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 460, 472 (SDNY 1962) (Murphy, J., dissenting); 376 U. S., at 54. But their loose and imprecise use by today's majority has, I fear, led it astray. "Dilution" thus refers to the effects of districting decisions not on an individual's political power viewed in isolation, but on the political power of a group. 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